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The Effects of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, and 
“Privateness” on Corporate Cultures 
Donald C. Langevoort 
There is widespread belief in both scholarship and business practice 
that internal corporate cultures materially affect economic outcomes for 
firms. An often-quoted book on management has argued that “the only 
thing of real importance that [business] leaders do is to create and manage 
culture.”1 A recent academic survey found that 51% of executives sampled 
consider corporate culture as a top three “value driver” at their companies, 
and another 27% say it is in the top five; a whopping 91% of them say that 
improving their corporate culture would increase their firm’s value.2 This 
has become an explosive subject of academic research as well. A 
prominent 2011 literature review on the connections between corporate 
culture and organizational effectiveness initially identified some 4,600 
scholarly articles from which to draw,3 a number that would be far larger 
today. 
In turn, there is also a growing belief that corporate governance 
arrangements materially affect corporate cultures. If this is true, it suggests 
an intriguing three-link causal chain: governance choices influence 
                                                     
 Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to 
Jennifer Hill, Hillary Sale, and participants at a Vanderbilt law and business workshop for helpful 
suggestions. This Article addresses many ideas relating to behavior and culture on which there is a 
massive amount of scholarship but will not offer correspondingly extensive citations. Footnotes will 
simply highlight some particularly notable examples from the various disciplines at work and their 
uses by legal scholars, with special attention to the amazingly rich contributions from the Berle 
symposia published in the Seattle University Law Review over the last decade. 
 1. EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 11 (3d ed. 2004); see also 
Boris Groysberg et al., The Leader’s Guide to Corporate Culture: How to Manage the Eight Critical 
Elements of Organizational Life, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 44. 
 2. See John R. Graham et al., Corporate Culture: Evidence from the Field 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23255, 2017). 
 3. See Chad A. Hartnell et al., Organizational Culture and Organizational Effectiveness: A 
Meta-Analytic Investigation of the Competing Values Framework’s Theoretical Suppositions, 96 J. 
APPLIED PSYCH. 677, 682 (2011). For more information on the same subject published more recently, 
see generally Elizabeth A. Martinez et al., Organizational Culture and Performance, 105 AM. ECON. 
REV. 331, 333–34 (2015) (assessing links between culture and performance). 
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corporate performance, at least in part via their effects on internal culture. 
This Article explores that possibility. The topic is important to lawyers and 
legal scholars because of the symbiotic nature of law and governance with 
an increased risk of enhanced corporate criminal and civil liability when 
cultures are judged to be deficient.4 Finding the right place for culture in 
governance is a heavy lift, deeply rooted in the intense academic and 
political battles about agency theory, shareholder primacy, and corporate 
social responsibility. As such, the aim of this Article is to explore the many 
ways corporate governance and culture are studied; to compare and 
contrast theories about what corporate culture is and how it works; and to 
study the ways in which it is influenced, and in turn influences, general 
social beliefs about economic power and privilege. 
By many accounts today (though hardly without controversy), the 
dominant norm in American corporate governance is shareholder primacy. 
As a result of the combined forces of law, culture, and economic 
incentives, managers are to act intently for the wealth-maximizing benefit 
of their shareholders. The theoretical justification for this truncated 
autonomy is that managers are naturally self-interested, requiring 
monitoring of various sorts in the name of (if not by) its shareholders in 
order to minimize opportunism in the exercise of power. To enthusiasts 
for this principal–agent model of governance, this embrace of the 
shareholder primacy norm in the last three or four decades has paid off in 
greater productivity, innovation, and capital formation. Many in financial 
economics and corporate law, thus, now take it as a normative given.5 To 
them, the arguments are only about whether we need to empower and 
protect shareholders a bit more, less, or whether we have it about right to 
achieve optimal shareholder wealth over the desired time frame and unit 
of measurement.6 
Against this enthusiasm, many sociologists and some legal scholars 
argue that the coupling of shareholder primacy and shareholder 
                                                     
 4. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 944–49 
(2017) [hereinafter Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance]. As discussed infra, the connection between 
culture and legal compliance programs has become a substantial subject of discussion in law and 
management studies, about which I have written a good deal. In the U.S., assessments of culture matter 
at least in terms of prosecutorial discretion and punishment, and increasingly via positive regulatory 
mandate. See id. at 940–44. Outside the U.S., the legal consequences of flawed corporate cultures are 
increasingly more explicit, if perhaps not all that aggressively enforced. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, 
Legal Personhood and Liability for Flawed Corporate Cultures (European Corporate Governance 
Institute, Law Working Paper No. 431/2018; Sydney Law School, Research Paper No. 19/03, 2018) 
(tracing the growth of interest in cultures in different corporate law systems). 
 5. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (providing a distinguished example of the embrace of shareholder primacy 
and a description of its benefits). 
 6. So, the debates over long- and short-termism, and about market prices as an accurate (or at 
least best available) measure of fundamental value in the long run are still inconclusive. 
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empowerment is toxic, with corrosive consequences for society in general 
and the long-run interests of firms themselves. They worry that corporate 
leaders have come proudly to self-identify as zealous agents for their 
shareholders and attack the myths associated with principal–agent theory 
insofar as it normalizes unfettered profit-seeking and gross income 
inequality.7 Demanding investors who applaud such managers—and the 
financial markets they drive through active trading in various financial 
instruments—are, in this portrait, sheep-clothed enemies of the public 
good. A substantial and increasing amount of popular and public discourse 
about greedy short-termism gives voice to this, as we shall see. 
Naturally enough, the sociologists and their acolytes in law view 
these aspects of governance entirely through the lens of culture. To those 
steeped in neoclassical economics, on the other hand, culture studies are 
too soft and mushy to have anything of use to offer compared to 
understanding the rational incentives that drive managerial and investor 
behavior. But, that assumption has been weakening for some time.8 The 
particular inspiration for my Article came from reading a recent series of 
papers in financial economics purporting to find that shareholder 
empowerment in corporate governance tends, as sociologists fervently 
predict, to degrade previously ethical corporate cultures. A study by 
Professors Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (GSZ) finds a significant 
positive correlation for publicly traded companies between survey-based 
indicators of how employees view the integrity of senior management and 
the firm’s financial performance going forward, value not immediately 
impounded in stock price.9 More pointedly, they find that privately owned 
firms have higher integrity scores on average than otherwise comparable 
public ones with large institutional investor block ownership.10 Culture, 
they argue, best explains these results, which implies that reducing 
shareholder empowerment would help restore integrity to corporate 
cultures. The authors are appropriately cautious about their findings, 
asking mainly that they provoke an intensive research agenda into the 
                                                     
 7. For an excellent book-length account, see generally GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE 
MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA (2009). 
 8. For a review, see Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff, The Trust Triangle: Law, 
Reputation, and Culture in Empirical Financial Research, J. BUS. ETHICS, June 20, 2019, at 1, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04229-1 [https://perma.cc/RT53-4KF4]. 
 9. Luigi Guiso et al., The Value of Corporate Culture, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 60, 65–66 (2015) 
[hereinafter GSZ]; see also, e.g., Jillian Grennan, A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased 
Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value 3 (March 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with Seattle University Law Review); Andrew von Nordenflycht, The Public Corporation—Friend or 
Foe of Professional Ethics? Ownership and Ethics in Securities Brokerage 3 (Apr. 22, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Seattle University Law Review). 
 10. GSZ, supra note 9, at 65–66. 
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economic significance of corporate cultures. From a lawyer’s perspective, 
my Article is in that same spirit. 
My conundrum question is this: suppose managerialism triumphed 
in the governance wars so as to regain its desired level of autonomy from 
shareholder pressures for boards and managers—would we then expect to 
see a cultural shift inside corporations toward greater honesty and civil 
engagement, and if so, why?11 A helpful diagnostic question is to ask how 
managers currently construe shareholder and market primacy. Have they 
internalized it as a value or do they instead resent the demands? My 
argument here leans more toward resentment, though my contribution is 
more about how to develop a credible hypothesis than how to prove it, 
which is ultimately an empirical matter.12 My hypothesis is that corporate 
cultures ordinarily reflect an inward point of view wherein the perceived 
(and maybe mythical) imperatives of organizational survival and success 
become the dominating values, not serving shareholders or anyone else. 
Culture is deeply self-protective. If so, more unfettered managerialism in 
pursuit of better corporate cultures would not be such an appealing 
solution, and indeed might just produce a different form of rent-seeking.13 
This then takes us to a second front in the governance wars.14 Many 
legal scholars recently (myself included) have written about the increasing 
demands of “publicness” on highly salient firms, especially those that are 
publicly traded.15 These are external, socially-generated pressures in the 
name of legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and outsider voice. As 
to these forces, sociologists and their legal kin are downright enthusiastic. 
After all, if shareholder primacy degrades corporate culture, then these 
pressures should have precisely the opposite effect, serving as a channel 
                                                     
 11. See generally Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the 
Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169 (2013) (arguing that shareholder 
primacy is already giving way to a new managerialist philosophy). 
 12. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561 (2015) (assessing both the strategic and substantive 
aspects of the academic debate). I do agree that segments of the investor community pushed the norm 
of shareholder primacy, at least in part, to enhance their own power and legitimacy. 
 13. This connects to work in financial economics showing that a shift from public to private 
status—i.e., a private equity transaction—reduces agency costs. See Jesse Edgerton, Agency Problems 
in Public Firms: Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts, 67 J. FIN. 2187, 2189–90 
(2012). 
 14. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What 
is the “Progressive” Agenda?, 2018 BYU L. REV. 267 (2018) (addressing the complicated nature of 
the political landscape as between shareholder and stakeholder primacy). 
 15. For articles dealing with publicness as a concept, see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert 
B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 337, 340 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
137 passim (2011); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 649 passim 
(2015). 
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by which pro-social instincts are infused into them. This, arguably, is what 
would rush in to freshen the cultural climate once the swamp of 
shareholder primacy is drained. But for many of the same reasons that I 
question the deep normativity of shareholder primacy, I am skeptical of 
this inference as well.16 
The remainder of this Article explains these doubts, which requires 
an introduction to the economics of corporate culture, a subject not yet 
well appreciated in corporate law. Accordingly, Part I introduces the battle 
over corporate cultures as part of a broader contestation about primacy in 
corporate governance, offering a perspective on the meaning of corporate 
culture, its place in political debates over corporate responsibility, and its 
usefulness to corporate law. This first Part also tries to define with more 
clarity the differences between the cultural norms of shareholder primacy 
and publicness. Part II is introductory as well, turning the reader’s 
attention to the overwhelmingly diverse scholarly perspectives on 
corporate culture (II(A)) and the essential place of corporate culture within 
the overarching canopy of social culture (II(B)). Part III moves on to ask 
about the work being done by corporate culture in terms of both law and 
governance, and the extent to which this can or should be thought of in 
functionalist terms. Parts IV and V are the main pay-off: an assessment of 
arguments in light of all the foregoing about the cultural causes and effects 
about shareholder primacy, publicness, and “privateness.” Part VI 
concludes with a closer look at the politics surrounding the corporate 
culture wars. 
I. GOVERNANCE AND CULTURE 
Matters relating to managerial prerogative vis-à-vis either 
shareholder rights or societal interests have been a contested intellectual 
and political battleground for the last fifty years, at least. The fundamental 
questions are by now familiar ones.17 Are shareholders or a broader set of 
stakeholders the intended beneficiaries of corporate law, and why?18 Then, 
depending on the response to that first question, what mix of rights and 
                                                     
 16. To be clear, I self-identify as seeking a more public-regarding conception of corporate rights 
and responsibilities, with shareholder power nonetheless playing a legitimate and important subsidiary 
role to check a dangerous excess of managerialism. Cf. Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing 
Power in American Corporations, 71 BUS. LAW. 381 (2015) (articulating a separation of powers 
analogy). 
 17. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER passim (Jennifer G. Hill & 
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (multiple chapters offering perspectives on this issue). This includes 
battling over using stock market prices as the dominating metric for good or bad governance. 
 18. To be sure, most would agree that the economic system and all its institutions exist for 
society’s benefit. Those who push a strong vision of shareholder primacy believe that it creates better 
conditions for maximum efficiency, innovation, and optimal social (as well as private) wealth. 
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responsibilities as among managers, directors, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders produces the optimal output of the preferred benefit? 
Students of corporate governance (and readers of the Berle symposia) 
know that there can be endless mixing and matching of possible answers. 
Even if shareholder best interest is the chosen goal, for instance, one can 
be in favor of either more managerial autonomy or greater shareholder 
power—this is still probably the biggest divide among legal scholars and 
financial economists. On the other hand, if one thinks that broader public 
or stakeholder interests deserve primacy, one could still be in favor of 
more managerial autonomy, more shareholder power, or (most commonly) 
enhanced stakeholder or government influence. 
The debates surrounding the role of the shareholder are mainly 
academic, but they connect to serious political battling that has been going 
on for many decades now. The usual historical narrative posits that 
managerialism held sway for a few decades during the middle part of the 
last century, enabling managers to share some of the rents with employees, 
communities, and the government (“benevolent managerialism”), though 
perhaps also wasting resources in sinecures and inefficiency.19 Exploring 
this was Adolf Berle’s project back in the day.20 Nearly everyone now 
agrees that some kind of inflection occurred around the late 1970s through 
the 1980s due to a mix of interrelated forces,21 including, in no particular 
order: (1) the growth of institutional investors who used their new-found 
leverage to achieve greater shareholder empowerment vis-à-vis 
management; (2) the rise of independent directors; (3) advances in the 
market for corporate control and a shift in the law dealing with control 
transactions from business judgment to something (in Delaware, at least) 
more shareholder-regarding;22 (4) technological change in both production 
and finance that turned corporate attention to new capital marketplace 
opportunities; (5) an explosion in scholarship in business and law that was 
enthusiastically in support of shareholder primacy to counter managerial 
selfishness (agency costs), the lessons of which became central in business 
                                                     
 19. For a discussion of the behavioral consequences of enhance managerial prerogative, see 
generally Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate 
Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043 (2003). 
 20. For one of many studies of Berle and the problems that interested him, see William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s 
Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010). 
 21. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1510–40 (2007). 
 22. See id. at 1520–28. Although Delaware law had a brief period in the mid-1980s that can so 
be described, it backed off any embrace of hostile control transactions in the Paramount Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Time Inc. litigation in 1989. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Nearly all other states have already 
moved to give management more leeway to defeat a bid, no matter how lucrative to shareholders. Of 
all the forces supposedly pushing in the direction of shareholder primacy, law is probably the weakest. 
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schools and law schools; (6) far more stock-based compensation for 
corporate executives; and (7) the stunning growth in the number of 
American households who invested in common stock, directly or 
indirectly, and could thus envision themselves as intended beneficiaries. 
While these were economic shifts, not just cultural ones, it is common to 
hear claims that the inflection brought about a new culture of shareholder 
primacy with the sole goal of shareholder wealth maximization.23 
Managers became agents, and shareholders became their principals. 
The political skirmishing in corporate governance that continues on 
today is about the consequences of this inflection, which plays out in the 
dark shadow of what today is immense public unease about economic 
fairness and opportunity. The current generation of battlers sort into 
different encampments that fight under three main banners.24 On one side 
are the staunch managerialists who simply want back the autonomy they 
arguably lost, and to preserve what they still have. They have a small cadre 
of allies in those who may be attracted to either shareholder or stakeholder 
primacy but think that strong managerialism is instrumentally the best way 
to pursue their preferred ends. Together, they fight against committed 
shareholder primacists who want more rights and greater managerial 
accountability to investors.25 We should not over-dramatize: it is not 
always clear how much value really is at stake as to the specific issues 
being contested here (e.g., staggered boards, proxy access, shareholder 
voice, say-on-pay); some of the tenacity seems more about identity and 
pride than large territorial gains.26 Still, combatants on each side push hard 
                                                     
 23. For a good discussion of all these changes and the shareholder-regarding culture they 
produced, see generally DAVIS, supra note 7. 
 24. Many of those leaning more to the conservative side argue that now that managerial and 
shareholder interests are better aligned via a set of largely non-legal institutions, labor, product, and 
financial markets can largely be left alone to generate the optimal incentives needed for wealth 
maximization. Their opponents say that a greater dose of legally-induced shareholder empowerment 
is still needed to counter a lingering excess of managerial prerogative. Compare ROBERTA ROMANO, 
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993), with LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
 25. To describe all this in war-like terms is hyperbole, of course; governance issues in the U.S. 
have never (at least not yet) received enough sustained public attention for that description to fit. In 
general, the managerialists are well organized and so have the upper hand in ordinary times. See 
generally Usha Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435 (2017) 
(pointing out that corporate law issues normally have low political visibility). Scandals, of course, 
have long prompted short-term legislative attention to governance abuses, which are the source of 
much of what we know today as corporate and (especially) federal securities law. See generally 
Bruner, supra note 14; Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 1817, 1820–22 (2007). On how fleeting the effects can be, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., 
The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic 
Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012). 
 26. See Claire A. Hill, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, 41 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475, 483–94 (2018) (giving illustrations of identity-driven arguments). Indeed, 
384 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:377 
to get their way from legislatures, agencies like the SEC, and courts (or at 
least try to block the same by their opponents27), exerting pressure on 
public and elite opinion to gain leverage. 
There is a second front in these governance wars. Those who wanted 
greater corporate social responsibility in the 1970s and 1980s were 
seemingly shoved aside as the fight between shareholder advocates and 
managers became the main event.28 So stakeholder primacists mostly grit 
their teeth through the 1990s. In 2001 and 2002, Enron and Worldcom 
finally gave them their told-you-so moment via what seemed to be 
shareholder wealth maximization run amok.29 By this time, the counter-
narrative had emerged, in sociology in particular, that treated agency cost 
theory and shareholder primacy as destructive myths that became deeply 
internalized as legitimate yet promoted corporate irresponsibility. The 
culture of wealth maximization had blinded all of us, they claimed, to what 
was now lost (expectations of benign managerialism in the interest of 
society as a whole) and the escalating risks that could be justified in the 
name of enhancing equity portfolios, including managers’ own bloated 
ones. Expectations that managers naturally pursued selfish goals (the 
justification for the principal–agent model of corporate governance) 
became dangerously self-fulfilling and normalizing. The global financial 
crisis a few years later extended that to the problem of systemic risk among 
financial firms, which brought with it much more pain and angst about 
whether society had lost its way in the relentless pursuit of wealth for both 
shareholders and managers.30 
                                                     
there is a good argument to be made that the battling simply creates the illusion that managerial power 
is being moderated, thereby deflecting responsibility and blame. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. 
Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 2034–37 (2014) (discussing 
myths in corporate law). Or maybe stalemate in the battling is good—a recognition that neither side 
deserves total victory. See generally Thompson, supra note 16 (discussing virtues of checks and 
balances in corporate governance). 
 27. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (challenging the 
legality of pro-shareholder reforms). 
 28. During the portion of the governance wars of the late 1970s and 1980s, dealing with the 
market for corporate control and hostile corporate takeovers, stakeholders (particularly labor, but also 
local communities) strongly allied with the managerialists and together won many more battles than 
they lost—indeed, to the point where the incidence of hostile takeovers diminished considerably. But 
they were being used for the most part; as sociologist critics insist, whatever happened to hostile 
takeovers, the trend toward shareholder wealth maximization continued along other paths. 
 29. These were massive financial reporting scandals that resulted in the insolvency of two of the 
country’s largest public companies. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution 
and the Devolution of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter 
Langevoort, Technological Evolution] (tracing the causes and consequences of the scandals). 
 30. On the connections between shareholder influence and losses in the crisis, see generally 
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 653 (2010). 
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Societal unease with the unchecked pursuit of private wealth and 
power underlies the distinctive demands of publicness. Publicness is a 
relatively new label in legal scholarship, if not necessarily a new idea. 
While publicness can simply refer to the purely regulatory consequences 
that arise when a firm becomes subject to the mandates of the federal 
securities laws, the construct is in fact deeply cultural. The label describes 
the consequences when influential actors in society expect corporate 
managers and owners to pay attention to public-regarding preferences and 
not heedlessly pursue selfish corporate objectives. As applied to corporate 
governance, this commonly comes in the form of insistence on more 
transparency, openness to others’ voices, and accountability for harms that 
threaten or are felt by persons outside the firm.31 Publicness is legitimacy-
based, claiming that the corporation’s right to exercise large-scale 
economic power comes with a quid pro quo—some sociologists pushing 
a similar idea call it “social license.”32 Insofar as it has a normative rather 
than purely descriptive connotation—i.e., that transparency, voice, and 
accountability are valuable public goods, not just common memes—it 
shares space with the progressive agendas of corporate social 
responsibility and sustainability, albeit with more emphasis on the process 
of governance than particular outcomes. 
The idea behind publicness is simple enough. Corporations that fall 
short of expectations suffer reputationally in many different ways when 
something serious goes wrong. And the legal consequences that follow 
will often be harsher because of those perceived shortcomings. Thus, it 
behooves boards of directors in particular to understand and acknowledge 
the special challenges that come when avoiding and dealing with potential 
scandals that implicate these values. Law is a very big part of publicness, 
in that sometimes these inchoate demands get worked into new legal rules 
or enforcement of existing rules by regulators and enforcers who share, 
promote, or are otherwise influenced by those societal values.33 The 
                                                     
 31. See Bruner, supra note 14, at 297–303. The original use of publicness in legal scholarship 
came from comparative administrative law, with the observation of how the demands of transparency, 
accountability, and voice that had become settled with respect to governmental authorities were being 
directed to powerful non-governmental organizations as well. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept 
of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 30–31 (2009). 
 32. See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses 
Go Beyond Compliance, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 313–22 (2004). As used here, publicness is a term 
of art for the amalgam of ways managerial autonomy is challenged by external public demands beyond 
simple law enforcement. It has connections to many scholarly constructs in various fields, such as 
reputational capital in economics and the “halo effect” in psychology and economics. 
 33. See Jill E. Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment, 83 
U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 679, 681 (2015) (analyzing Morgan scandals). See generally Hillary A. Sale, J.P. 
Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014) (analyzing Morgan 
scandals). 
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securities laws are a favored tool for this insofar they address a potent 
source of private privilege and power (large corporations) with a built-in 
bias for both transparency and accountability, and some inviting pathways 
for voice as well via shareholder voting. 
A clear manifestation of publicness is the increasing 
acknowledgement that bolstering a healthy corporate culture is part of 
officers’ and directors’ business judgment responsibilities. Growing 
pressure in this direction has stemmed from noxious compliance (and 
seemingly cultural) disasters that go back to Enron and the financial crisis 
and extend forward to contemporary failures at firms like Wells Fargo, 
General Motors, Volkswagen, and the money center banks caught up in 
the LIBOR-rigging scandal.34 The Department of Justice and certain 
regulatory authorities have stressed that evidence of an unhealthy 
corporate culture may matter in terms of how painful a sanction is imposed 
in the event of wrongdoing, or upon whom.35 There is even more of a buy-
in to this in European countries.36 The Netherlands central bank, for 
instance, has a team of social scientists (mostly psychologists) trained to 
spot dysfunctional behaviors and cultures and who can recommend 
leadership changes as a corrective if needed.37 
Corporate culture has thus become part of the governance wars on 
both fronts.38 Anti-managerialists accuse their opponents in the executive 
suite of enabling cultures of greed and arrogance that lead to the corporate 
                                                     
 34. See generally Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and 
Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2013) (discussing financial crisis scandals); 
Benjamin van Rooij & Adam Fine, Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational Processes of 
Deviancy, ADMIN. SCI., Sept. 2018 (discussing recent scandals). For recent discussions on how to 
regulate with a view toward better cultures, see Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance 
Programs Fail—and How to Fix Them, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 116; Linda K. Treviño 
et al., Regulating for Ethical Culture, BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y, May 23, 2018, at 57. Both articles point 
to the pressing need to develop better metrics by which the quality of corporate cultures and climates 
can be assessed. 
 35. I have explored the idea of challenges associated with a “culture of compliance” in depth 
elsewhere and so will not address the cultural dimension of compliance programs to any great extent 
here. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 4, at 944–45 and passim. 
 36. See generally Hill, supra note 4 (comparing jurisdictions around the world). 
 37. See generally DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE: 
FOUNDATIONS, PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 159 (2015); John M. Conley et al., Can Soft 
Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central Bank’s Supervision of Behavior and 
Culture, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 773 (2019). 
 38. This is particularly at the federal level, with efforts to limit the SEC’s disclosure authority to 
matters of financial materiality and the goals of securities regulation to investor protection and 
(especially) capital formation. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: 
CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 108, 164–66 (2016) 
[hereinafter LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE]. As Mark Roe points out, something of a bargain exists 
among managers, investors, and the state of Delaware to minimize stakeholder pressures on otherwise 
efficient governance arrangements. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 
2493–94 (2005). 
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scandals we read about with all too much frequency. The managerialists 
return fire with charges, arguably supported by research like GSZ, of 
rampant cultural degradation by selfish investors who force managers to 
obsess over short-term results.39 These cross-claims imply something 
(accurately or not) about group-level character and disposition, which in 
turn affects attributions of responsibility and blame when good or bad 
things happen. They help portray organizational actors as good guys or 
bad guys, perceptions that become usable ammunition in the political and 
legal skirmishing. 
Before moving on to examine governance and culture in more detail, 
note something about the two separate factions against which the 
managerialists seem to be fighting. In principle (and in fact), those 
favoring more of a public-facing role for large corporations along the 
second front should be very wary of those who fight on the other front for 
more shareholder influence. But, the politics of corporate governance are 
complicated. Shareholder and stakeholder advocates have a common foe 
in the managerialists, and the managerialists have considerable political 
clout. They thus have to fight as allies to avoid a beating, fundamental 
philosophical differences notwithstanding. As a result, the biggest 
investors often appear as leading advocates for public-regarding values, 
and progressives often support greater shareholder rights.40 Institutional 
investors like Blackrock—and even more so public pension fund 
investors41—play the publicness game quite openly.42 As such, 
shareholder and stakeholder interests can easily get lumped together as 
kindred challenges to managerial autonomy. And so, any evidence that 
somehow associates increased shareholder rights with bad culture, fairly 
                                                     
 39. As past Berle symposia contributions have amply shown, many commentators claim that 
shareholder primacy and empowerment are the enemy of the common good and, thus, could be 
expected to join in the celebration of empirical evidence that associates it with a higher incidence of 
bad corporate behavior. As discussed infra, this was the point championed by the late Lynn Stout, both 
in individual work and joint efforts with Margaret Blair. For significant examples, see generally Stout, 
supra note 11. See also Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 297 (2015); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001). 
 40. See generally Bruner, supra note 14 (describing how many forces lead to this complicate 
political map, which among other things produce a “left-center” embrace of shareholder rights in 
federal securities law, but an inconsistent-seeming skepticism of shareholder primacy as to matters of 
the state corporate law). 
 41. See generally DAVID H. WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: 
LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018) (exploring the law and politics of labor’s use of securities 
regulation and corporate law devices). 
 42. In the right circumstances, institutional shareholder pressure—and its influence on stock 
prices—can be important pathways through which publicness norms spread. See Chitru S. Fernando 
et al., Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart Money, 52 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 2023, 2024–25 (2017). 
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or not, can be appropriated by politically savvy managerialists to claim 
that more autonomy on the whole—including freedom from publicness in 
all its manifestations—would bring about healthier corporate cultures and 
better outcomes for all. This connects to Mark Roe’s recent conjecture that 
the contemporary crusade against short-termism allows executives to 
deflect responsibility for the economic dislocation palpably felt by the 
public: “‘We’re not the problem’ . . . . ‘It’s the short-term traders and the 
activist shareholders that prevent us from being the good guys we’d really 
otherwise be. Our hands are tied.’”43 
II. IN SEARCH OF CORPORATE CULTURE 
A. Interdisciplinarity 
Now that this Article has introduced the relationship among 
corporate culture, shareholder primacy, and publicness, the next two 
Sections explore the diverse scholarly perspectives on corporate culture 
and pinpoint its essential place within the overarching canopy of social 
culture. To be clear up front, my aim here is not to assess the consequences 
for the firm of either shareholder power or publicness. Rather, it is to ask 
what role culture plays in that process, and what is going on in the 
collective mindset of the firm. Many scholars, including occasional 
contributors to prior Berle symposia, have made more direct arguments 
without resorting to cultural explanations or invoking soft concepts like 
social construction or legitimacy.44 For example, they may argue that 
greater shareholder power leads directly to certain outcomes (e.g., short-
termism). Perhaps that is sensible, in the name of parsimony. If incentives 
and revealed preferences tell a convincing enough story as a matter of 
theory or empirical observation, why bother with culture? I have some 
answers, but they will have to wait. The remainder of this still-introductory 
Section simply takes inventory of the interdisciplinary tools available to 
study corporate culture once we choose to pay attention to it.45 Readers 
already familiar with all this can skip forward. 
While there are many definitions of culture in organizational studies, 
we can think of culture as an internal “system of shared values defining 
what is important, and norms[] defining appropriate attitudes and 
                                                     
 43. Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 116 (2018). 
 44. For a good discussion, see id. at 75–82. 
 45. Legal scholars have drawn from this work for some time, often using it to mount critical 
attacks on the conservative, laissez faire attitudes in corporate law that fail to restrain anti-social 
corporate norms. An early legal classic is CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE 
SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975). 
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behaviors”46 or, more simply perhaps, “how we do things around here.”47 
These are capacious to be sure. At its core, corporate culture deals with 
taken-for-granted values about good and bad, right and wrong, legitimate 
and illegitimate, in the way the firm conducts its business. Culture extends 
as well into the more mundane, including styles of speech, appropriate 
appearance, and the like. These are less important but not inconsequential; 
expected shirt colors or style of dress might have little meaning in any 
deep sense, for example, but send a message indirectly about authority and 
conformity. 
This is where assessing the cultural causes and effects of something 
like shareholder primacy gets hard. First, the general assumption in the 
literature is that neither owners nor senior management teams can 
determine the culture (though they surely have a “tone at the top” role in 
it).48 We are looking for powerful norms that influence a large portion of 
managers and others who get work done. And we are looking for beliefs 
and values that are embraced. Strong shareholder pressure surely has 
incentive effects: if a small set of large institutional investors can demand 
the replacement of the chief executive officer (CEO), or ramp up 
compensation incentives to align managerial preferences with those of 
transient shareholders, that power will be felt inside the firm. But, there is 
no reason to assume that norms will shift to legitimize that power. To the 
contrary, the consequences might be resentment and reactance from the 
managers whose autonomy lessens. 
Indeed, that is the claim I am making here. Particularly as to applied 
practitioners in law and business, there is a desire for more than this kind 
of theory or abstraction in invoking culture. Practitioners want the ability 
to assess, if not actually feel, culture in operation—to understand its 
content and the routes by which its forces travel. So where to look for 
useful insights?49 This is where sociologists and cultural anthropologists 
claim their authority. Such deep dives, they say, are precisely what their 
field is good at.50 Researchers do sustained ethnographic studies inside 
                                                     
 46. Charles A. O’Reilly & Jennifer A. Chatman, Culture as Social Control: Corporations, Cults, 
and Commitment, 18 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 157, 166 (1996). 
 47. Treviño et al., supra note 34, at 60. 
 48. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 4, at 939. 
 49. An excellent recent review along these lines is Jennifer A. Chatman & Charles A. O’Reilly, 
Paradigm Lost: Reinvigorating the Study of Organizational Culture, 36 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 199, 202–
13 (2016). 
 50. For a thought-provoking call for more use of ethnography in corporate governance and law, 
see generally Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law or: A Black Corporation, a Christian 
Corporation, and a Māori Corporation Walk into a Bar..., 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353, 357 (2016). 
For notable examples of corporate ethnography, see for example KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN 
ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET (2009); ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF 
CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988); WILLIAM M. O’BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: 
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individual companies, spending time on the inside to hear their 
descriptions and stories and identify the myths, routines, ceremonies, and 
totems that collectively come to define what is legitimate and valued or 
treated with scorn or disgust. Less intrusive techniques are available as 
well: structured interviews and surveys to elicit impressions from a wider 
range of persons in a firm or industry, which can be pieced together into 
coherent accounts of both commonalities and differences in expressed 
beliefs.51 
Large organizations operate on a scale that is hard for any research 
team to observe in real time, however, which necessarily means that it will 
be studying just a slice of the enterprise, and only at a particular time. 
Moreover, it can be difficult to gain access to the most sensitive personnel 
within an organization or know that they are being candid rather than 
reciting from internalized scripts. Given these challenges, the risk is that 
interpretation of culture becomes more art than science, enabling the 
researchers’ own prior assumptions and biases to take hold. First-rate 
ethnographic work in the corporate area exists notwithstanding these 
challenges,52 though the most influential contemporary research in the 
sociology of corporate behavior appears to be more a mix of theory (e.g., 
field theory, social constructionism) and data analysis—very much 
resembling what GSZ does.53 
While the field of organizational behavior might have been formed 
under the influence of sociology, today it draws just as much from research 
in psychology, particularly social cognition. Here, the individual brain 
becomes the main focus of inquiry into judgment and decision-making 
inside business organizations.54 The main tools for understanding 
                                                     
THE WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING (1992); John M. Conley & William M. 
O’Barr, Crime and Custom in Corporate Society: A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct, 
60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1997). More generally on research challenges, see DAVID A. 
WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY: WHY ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERS (2008); Greg 
Urban & Kyung-Nan Koh, Ethnographic Research on Modern Business Corporations, 42 ANN. REV. 
ANTHROP. 139 (2013). 
 51. See Garry C. Gray & Susan S. Silbey, Governing Inside the Organization: Interpreting 
Regulation and Compliance, 120 AM. J. SOC. 96, 106–07 (2014) (using both ethnography and 
structured interviews to study compliance practices). 
 52. See Marina Welker, Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the Corporation, 39 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 397, 404–06 (2016). 
 53. For examples of these mixed methodologies, see Neil Fligstein, The Theory of Fields and Its 
Application to Corporate Governance, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 237 (2016); Jiwook Jung & Frank 
Dobbin, Agency Theory as Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts and Fund Managers Perform Their 
Roles, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 291 (2016). 
 54. An excellent discussion of the divide between sociology and psychology in organizational 
behavior with a welcome stress on ways it might be bridged is Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, 
Macro Organizational Psychology, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 350, 353 (J. Keith 
Murnighan ed., 1993). More recently, with a focus on culture and other forces at work in determining 
responses to legal demands, see Ruthanne Huising & Susan S. Silbey, From Nudge to Culture and 
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perception and choice are controlled laboratory experiments. Of particular 
relevance to thinking about legal compliance is the burgeoning sub-
discipline of behavioral ethics—judgment and decision-making in choices 
about right and wrong, including obedience to law.55 There are massive 
numbers of interesting studies, which in turn are described in a number of 
very accessible books and extensive literature reviews of behavioral ethics 
by prominent psychologists and management scholars.56 Legal scholars 
have drawn extensively from social cognition and the study of managerial 
traits to shed light on numerous issues of corporate governance and 
compliance.57 
There are severe methodological challenges to the use of psychology 
in organizational behavior as well. However, even if sound in 
experimental design, experiments may fail to capture the social richness 
and incentive structures found in complex organizations. The individual’s 
behavior, or at best small group behavior, is the focus of study. This 
methodological individualism means that culture is thereby diminished in 
importance. There may also be concern that decision-making in business 
settings is by people who have been selected for and survived the rigors of 
competition and are thus not representative of the more random sampling 
that generates subjects for psychology experiments. 
So, culture remains slippery to grab hold of, leading to some 
inevitable methodological accommodations to gain traction. Some 
psychologists working on organizational behavior, for example, simply 
assume from common sense or anecdotal observation that the same 
heuristics and biases found in individual judgment will naturally be 
replicated in corporate cultures, perhaps even amplified.58 That is, if 
people generally work hard cognitively to maintain—accurately or not—
a self-conception as good, law-abiding citizens, we would expect to find 
the same work being done for the firm by its internal culture. 
Other empirical work in organizational behavior tries to get at culture 
indirectly. “Upper echelon” research focuses on the impact of firm leaders 
on corporate behaviors, following up on a long-standing debate between 
                                                     
Back Again: Coalface Governance in the Regulated Organization, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 91, 
105–07 (2018). 
 55. For a recent overview, see generally YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: 
CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2018); LANGEVOORT, SELLING 
HOPE, supra note 38, at 28. 
 56. See, e.g., EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE COLLAR 
CRIMINAL 135–37 (2016); Nicholas Epley & David Tannenbaum, Treating Ethics as a Design 
Problem, BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y., May 2017, at 73; Treviño et al., supra note 34; Linda Klebe Treviño 
et al., (Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 635 (2014). 
 57. Myself included. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 4, at 950–51. 
 58. For a good survey, see generally Norbert Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing 
Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCH. REV. 687 (1996). 
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those who think leadership drives both culture and choice and those who 
deem leaders to be largely of symbolic or ceremonial significance. 
Numerous researchers seek proof in one direction or the other; one recent 
study confidently found a clear link running from individual CEO 
personality characteristics relating to adaptability and attention to detail to 
the prevailing culture, for example, and then from culture to objective 
measures of financial performance.59 That finding sounds a lot like 
financial economics. 
Economists arrived late to culture studies; in neoclassical economic 
models, as noted earlier, culture was thought to offer little of use given the 
commitment to rational expectations and revealed preferences. But for the 
last few decades, more and more economists, too, have come to accept that 
there are powerful connections between culture of various sorts and 
economic outcomes.60 They see corporate cultures as a potentially efficient 
means of coordinating complex activity and, perhaps, countering both 
agency costs and free rider problems.61 
Unlike sociologists and cultural anthropologists, economists are 
dedicated functionalists with efficiency as the prime criterion, and they are 
more likely to make inferences about culture from observable inputs and 
outputs than subjective assessment. As data sources become bigger and 
more manipulable, these observations become more intriguing. A good 
example is a study showing that firms with CEOs who benefit from 
suspicious and possibly illegal activity (options backdating) are more 
likely to engage in unrelated misbehaviors as well, signaling an unethical 
culture.62 In addition to economic, sociological, and psychological studies 
on corporate cultures, there are other cross-disciplinary approaches as 
well. Behavioral ethics has particularly interesting insights that, for 
                                                     
 59. See Charles A. O’Reilly, III et al., The Promise and Problems of Organizational Culture: 
CEO Personality, Culture, and Firm Performance, 39 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 595, 607 (2014). 
 60. Earlier work by GSZ focused on general cultural forces and their impact on economic 
behavior. Luigi Guiso et al., Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 25–30 
(2006). They connect general culture and corporate culture in Luigi Guiso et al., Corporate Culture, 
Societal Culture, and Institutions, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 336, 337–38 (2015). 
 61. E.g., David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 93 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); Ernst Fehr, 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Culture 2–4 (UBS Int’l Ctr. Of Econ. In Soc’y Public Paper 
No. 7, 2018). For my commentary, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of 
“Corporate Culture” in Law and Economics, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 80 (2006) 
[hereinafter Langevoort, Black Box] (discussing adaptive theory of cultural content). 
 62. Lee Biggerstaff et al., Suspect CEOs, Unethical Culture and Corporate Misbehavior, 117 J. 
FIN. ECON. 98, 99–100 (2015); see also Robert Davidson et al., Executives’ “Off the Job” Behavior, 
Corporate Culture and Financial Reporting Risk, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 7 (2015). 
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example, support some of the predictions of conventional economics.63 
Advances in cognitive neuroscience—the newest wave of behavioral 
research64—show some early promise as well in assessing the impact of 
culture on group beliefs and social behaviors.65 
All these different ways of getting at corporate culture produce a 
useful ecological diversity. But purists in each discipline too often seem 
not to read each other, much less collaborate, and we have noted some of 
the mutual mistrust directed at the respective methodologies. Sociologists 
and anthropologists draw a fairly hard line to push back against causal 
accounts and lessons that focus on individual-level behaviors and 
interventions rather than social forces. Famously, they treat the standards 
and metrics economists use—market efficiency and principal-agency 
conflicts, in particular—as the products of social construction manifesting 
themselves in observable behaviors only because they are believed to be 
true—Robert Merton’s idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy played out in 
markets.66 That, in turn, makes conventional economists’ collective heads 
explode. Here is where the governance and culture battle lines form. 
B. Corporate Cultures Inside Social Culture 
Corporate culture operates within an overarching canopy of social 
culture. To be sure, some law-oriented discussions of corporate culture 
simply seem to assume that shared values and beliefs are entirely firm-
specific, so that all the interesting and important instigators of cultural 
differences are at work inside the boundaries of a given firm. That can be 
true almost by definition. Corporate cultures are the belief systems that 
operate with respect to the firm and its activities, so they are necessarily 
internal to it. But that focus misses something very important. 
                                                     
 63. For a thorough discussion, see Eyal Zamir, Reinforcing Law and Economics: Behavioral 
Support for the Predictions of Standard Economic Analysis (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Legal 
Research Paper No. 18-17, 2018) (on file with Seattle University Law Review). 
 64. On the promise and limits of neuroeconomics, see generally Carlos Alós-Ferrer, A Review 
Essay on Social Neuroscience: Can Research on the Social Brain and Economics Inform Each Other?, 
56 J. ECON. LIT. 234 (2018); Owen D. Jones, Brain Perspectives on Investor Behavior and Decision-
Making Errors, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 349 (2018). For a useful introduction to neuroeconomics, see 
generally ROBERT M. SOPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT THEIR BEST AND WORST 
(2017). 
 65. For an interesting commentary on the role of “groupishness” in organizational ethical 
behavior points to the role of oxytocin in the human brain, see Jesse Kluver et al., Behavioral Ethics 
for Homo Economicus, Homo Heuristicus, and Homo Duplex, 123 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 150, 154 (2014) (noting that “[a]ll of these consequences of the release of oxytocin serve 
a group-related purpose—namely, they serve to bind individuals to highly cooperative higher-level 
units, often in the service of outcompeting other groups”). 
 66. E.g., Jung & Dobbin, supra note 53, at 319 (following Merton). For a somewhat less critical 
view, see generally Ezra Zuckerman, Market Efficiency: A Sociological Perspective, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF FINANCE 223 (Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda, eds., 2012). 
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As anthropologist Greg Urban stressed in an essay for an earlier 
Berle symposium, firm boundaries are actually very porous when it comes 
to external cultural influences.67 From CEOs on down, employees bring 
multiple aspects of the broader “outside” social and economic culture to 
work with them each day. Urban notes that this is essential to business 
success. Acute awareness of marketplace opportunities, risks, and trends 
requires being in synch with these broader social forces and their 
normative content. Individual corporate cultures (and industry cultures, 
etc.) are better seen as subcultures in motion within this complicated 
societal fabric, not discrete or insular phenomena. Indeed, as we shall see, 
the dominant sociological account of the corporate culture treats it as part 
of the much larger fabric of social culture, of which any given corporate 
culture is but a part.68 
Many important legal scholars have drawn useful insights for how 
corporate law operates (or should operate) from the assumption that 
general social norms strongly influence corporate behavior. John Coffee 
once suggested that the likelihood of minority shareholder abuse probably 
correlates fairly closely with perceived level of social cohesion, suggesting 
a top-down effect of general norms of law-abidingness translating into 
norms of corporate behavior.69 Ed Rock famously developed a shaming 
theory of how Delaware case law works. It often subjects defendants to 
meaningful public criticism—even while absolving them from actual 
liability.70 The lively scholarship of corporate “publicness,” with which 
we began, stresses the behavioral demands that come from social 
expectations about the terms and conditions that go with the exercise of 
corporate power.71 
In financial economics, there are many scholars exploring the causal 
links between various manifestations of general cultural belief (e.g., 
                                                     
 67. See also Greg Urban, Corporate Compliance as a Problem of Cultural Motion, 69 RUTGERS 
U. L. REV. 495 (2017) (extending ideas to corporate compliance). See generally Greg Urban, 
Corporations in the Flow of Culture, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 321 (2016) (discussing interplay of social 
and corporate norms). 
 68. This is a main point in the survey by Dupont & Karpoff, supra note 8. 
 69. See John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms Matter:? A Cross-Country Examnination of the Private 
Benefits of Control, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (2001) (concluding that norms may be more powerful 
than constitutive legal rules). 
 70. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1009, 1047–49 (1997). 
 71. For other law-oriented discussions of corporations and cultural norms, see generally, e.g., 
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the 
Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251 (2002). 
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religiosity72 and politics73) and corporate financial decisions or 
performance. These studies suggest that firms whose principal office is 
located in a geographic area with distinctively liberal or conservative 
views, for instance, make different business and financial decisions from 
peer firms in different locales. GSZ makes a brief reference to the fact that 
a disproportionate number of high integrity firms in their sample were 
from the southern part of the U.S.74 
To the extent that these external social norms are healthy ones, this 
is a good thing. If social norms strongly tend toward trustworthiness, 
cooperation, and law-abidingness, the corporate culture has less work to 
do in eliciting the same behaviors inside the firm.75 There will be little or 
no role conflict; employees will be happier and more productive. The late 
Lynn Stout was a forceful advocate for getting rid of the detritus of 
shareholder primacy so that directors can follow their natural pro-social 
instincts rather than be made slaves to the production of quarterly earnings 
growth and high stock prices.76 This seems to be the GSZ inference, too. 
However, two concerns arise from the influence of external social 
norms. One is that broader social norms may not necessarily be healthy; 
we can all readily think of aspects of our prevailing culture that 
corporations might want to select against rather than for in seeking 
managerial talent: disrespect for authority, conspicuous consumption, 
excessive individualism, and self-centeredness.77 Worse, there are some 
countries and regions where the prevailing culture goes so far as to 
normalize individual corruption.78 For instance, a securities firm might 
                                                     
 72. On the role of religious beliefs in corporate governance, see generally Mufaddal Baxamusa 
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consciously try to de-emphasize sales pressure in customer interactions via 
ethics training, only to run up against resistance from financial advisers 
who interact frequently in their home locales with peers in other firms who 
continue to associate inflated sales with status and success. The corporate 
culture will have to push back against these unwanted pressures. 
The other concern—and the potentially more insidious one—is that 
these healthy social norms come to be seen as inconsistent with the 
perceived “what it takes” to succeed. The firm may want hyper-
motivation, risk-taking, and competitive arousal in doses well beyond 
what ordinary candidates display. It will select for the extraordinary 
candidates along these dimensions, of course, but may also have to attract 
others and acculturate them into the desired mindset. If so, corporate 
culture is now doing a very different kind of work. We shall play out this 
story in the next sections because it has much to say about the 
manageability of corporate culture—for both good and bad. The idea that 
boards and executives cannot possibly have meaningful control over all 
the external cultural forces at work inside the organization injects a useful 
cautionary note in discussions about the legal responsibility to manage 
culture. 
Neither can we assume that the corporate culture operates uniformly 
or effectively throughout the corporation. Localized subcultures can 
emerge at odds with what is believed or valued elsewhere in the firm, and 
there will be individual defectors (perhaps many) who do not get, and may 
actively resist, the preferred messages. A study of the “Nut Island” effect 
tells the story of an award-winning unit of the Boston Harbor waste 
disposal authority that came to resist oversight from what it regarded as 
illegitimate supervision, turning that aim into such a potent belief that it 
ultimately put raw sewage into the harbor rather than acknowledge the 
need for help from above.79 We will come back to this in exploring how 
culture is transmitted inside organizations. 
It is also worth stressing the connection between peer cultures and 
boundaries of the firm. In sociology and financial economics, researchers 
have demonstrated the ease by which both information and ideas travel 
                                                     
corporate governance and behavior. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law in Corporate 
Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW (Jeffrey Gordon & 
Gorge Ringe eds., 2018). 
 79. See Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 51. See generally Niki A. den Nieuwenboer et al., Middle Managers and 
Corruptive Routine Translation: The Social Production of Deceptive Performance, 28 ORG. SCI. 781 
(2017) (discussing conscious disregard of supervisory rules by sub-unit). 
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from firm to firm via network linkages80 and governance overlaps (e.g., 
directors who serve on multiple boards, law firms that serve multiple 
clients, etc.). Innovations in governance tools, like poison pills for fighting 
off would-be acquirers81 or options backdating to make employee stock 
options more lucrative to the grantees,82 for example, have been shown to 
travel both of those pathways to determine who would be early adopters 
and who would be late or not adopt at all. 
These diverse perspectives suggest that it is overly simple to frame 
questions about corporate cultures in terms of, say, the influence of the 
CEO on the organization’s culture. And even if that is the focus, what 
drives the CEO’s perceptions and beliefs? A CEO who runs in social or 
political circles that celebrates shareholder culture, religiosity, social 
service, or inflated entitlement may be moved by those values enough to 
try to influence the firm to pursue them as well. Whether he or she will 
succeed is far from clear. We desperately need a theory about how 
corporate culture forms and changes (or resists change) and the evidence 
to back it up. 
III. FUNCTIONALISM 
Having surveyed the meaning and role of corporate culture in various 
disciplines and debates, we can now wade into deeper waters about the 
work being done by corporate culture for law and governance. The 
relatively more recent contributions by economists to the study of 
corporate cultures posit that cultures exist and persist to the extent that 
they do useful work in promoting competitive marketplace success.83 They 
generate efficiencies. In developing their hypothesis about corporate 
integrity, for example, GSZ spun out an interesting story. They assume 
that certain ethical commitments (keeping your word, loyal customer 
service) have long-term financial value but are constantly under short-term 
stress.84 All other things being equal, turning these strategies into non-
negotiable cultural values inside the firm helps maintain internal 
coherence and resist these stressors. But when the firm is publicly-held, 
                                                     
 80. See generally Andrew J. Hoffman, Linking Organizational and Field-Level Analyses: The 
Diffusion of Corporate Environmental Practice, 14 ORG. & ENV’T 133 (2001) (offering a cultural 
account of how environmental practices spread in firms and industries). 
 81. See generally Gerald F. Davis & Henrich Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance 
Changes in the 1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1997) (discussing takeover defenses). 
 82. See generally John Bizjak et al., Options Backdating and Board Interlocks, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 4821 (2009) (discussing executive compensation practices). 
 83. Sociologists have generally been viewed as anti-functionalist, but this is not essential. For an 
assessment of the state of knowledge on corporate cultures in terms of functionalism or not, see 
Chatman & O’Reilly, supra note 49, at 205–06. 
 84. See GSZ, supra note 9, at 62–63. 
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the stress is harder to resist: the stock price fails to reflect the hard-to-value 
norms, and so executive compensation and retention incentives shift 
greater attention to the shorter-term.85 This is a familiar argument in the 
long-term versus short-term debate in corporate law. The disclosure 
demands associated with public status make it harder to enforce internal 
norms when violated. This is because investors and other external 
stakeholders fear that the disclosed violation may just be the “tip of the 
iceberg,” indicating more problems ahead. In the absence of such 
enforcement, the culture is more likely to devolve via loss of integrity. 
From this they hypothesize that more CEO power vis-à-vis shareholders 
(as proxied by relatively larger compensation packages) should correlate 
positively with integrity, which they find to be the case. 
While surely insightful, GSZ’s story begs all sorts of questions: is 
the top-down inculcation of values really how it works; is integrity really 
the long-term value maximizing strategy for a firm, or is it instead Oliver 
Williamson’s famous “opportunism with guile”;86 is the market (or are 
large investors) really unable to value corporate reputation on a forward-
looking basis? GSZ assumes that the market eventually learns of the value, 
so why wouldn’t that already have occurred with enough prior experience? 
Their response to all of these questions, of course, is the empirical 
evidence: the positive correlation between integrity and subsequent 
performance; the negative correlation between integrity and large share 
ownership. Acknowledging that there is still much more to figure out, they 
conclude, is at least a “first cut” that their story holds up.87 
Economists’ approach to corporate culture is mostly theory-driven, 
albeit with some loosening of the strict assumptions underlying 
neoclassical economic theory.88 In competitive markets, culture is of 
importance to the extent that it makes firms better able to survive and 
thrive. Cultural content will vary from firm to firm, but inferior cultures 
will gradually be weeded out in favor of more adaptive ones. So, what 
would inferior or adaptive mean? As noted, the standard answer focuses 
on transaction costs.89 Efficient organizational behavior requires the 
coordination of a potentially immense number of agents. If there is 
                                                     
 85. On this dynamic with respect to investments in compliance, see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon 
et al., Taking Compliance Seriously (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 588, 2018). 
 86. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 453, 458 (1993). 
 87. GSZ, supra note 9, at 75. 
 88. See generally Kreps, supra note 61 (discussing coordination function); see generally, e.g., 
THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE (Cary Cooper et al. 
eds., 2001); Eric Van den Steen, On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate Culture), 41 RAND 
J. ECON. 617 (2010); Jesper B. Sorensen, The Strength of Corporate Culture and the Reliability of 
Firm Performance, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 70 (2002). 
 89. See Fehr, supra note 61; Langevoort, Black Box, supra note 61. 
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considerable disagreement among these agents as to what is true, or 
important, or legitimate, coordination will bog down in the face of 
countless negotiations of reality. By hypothesis, then, a valuable corporate 
culture is one that better puts everyone on the same page. 
That, by itself, says nothing about the content of those beliefs. But 
the same theory suggests that particular belief systems will be favored 
insofar as they more effectively motivate or enable competitive activity. 
Most economists assume that rational perceptual accuracy characterizes 
successful economic actors. But especially from among behavioral 
economists, the possibility was raised that there could be adaptive 
heuristics and biases at work in corporate cultures that depart from steely-
eyed realism in favor of more motivational belief systems. The most 
obvious possibility is the optimistic, “can do” culture that has an excess 
(though not to a dangerous extreme) belief in the ability of the firm to 
prosper even against the odds.90 Such cultures might promote 
perseverance, risk-taking, and long-term thinking that are rewarded on 
average as against more cautious, angst-laden competitors, even if the 
likelihood of occasional bad outcomes is also greater. 
This idea matters to both law and governance. Some twenty years 
ago, I made the speculative claim that overconfidence in managerial 
behavior and corporate cultures posed a particularly interesting and 
disturbing legal problem with respect to both liability standards (the 
application of state of mind tests like good faith and scienter) and the 
deterrence of corporate misbehavior.91 Since then, I have written about 
many different manifestations of these legal problems.92 Other legal 
scholars now have as well,93 with what is now an abundance of support 
from social scientists. In due course, consideration has been given to other 
distorted beliefs that might be individually and culturally adaptive as well. 
In general, I have come to believe that competitive incentives favor 
cultures that promote in-group loyalty, aggression toward out-groups, and 
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the rationalization of moderately selfish transgressions of norms of good 
behavior.94 Plenty of literature can now be cited to support these 
predictions, although most of it admittedly relates to individual cognition 
and behavior, not culture per se.95 
This focus on the adaptive culture speaks to the possibility of cultural 
change: who, if anyone, has the ability to change the prevailing culture 
away from an excess of profitably self-serving bias? This is a key question 
for law to ask, given recent emphasis on reforming wayward cultures by 
imposing top-down responsibility for preventing failures. One 
discouraging possibility is that cultures are largely resistant to change 
absent a shock to the system, which is unlikely to be administered by 
choice if the company is not yet in crisis. An aggressive culture perseveres 
absent strong negative feedback, which can be lacking during frothy 
market conditions and low enforcement intensity. Leaders are usually 
better off wrapping themselves in the culture than fighting against it. 
This is a dismal sounding assessment. So, what about GSZ and its 
more optimistic view that the norm of integrity has adaptive value? My 
intuition is that it depends on marketplace conditions—where commitment 
to integrity and service really does have a long-term payoff and can be 
signaled credibly, it can emerge and persist.96 But it is inevitably at risk in 
the “last period” setting, when key actors come to believe, accurately or 
not, that the firm’s or their own personal time horizons are tightening 
                                                     
 94. And that competitive success itself increases these perceptions, at least at the individual level. 
See Amos Schurr & Ilana Ritov, Winning a Competition Predicts Dishonest Behavior, 113 PNAS 
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enough dysfunction in lawmaking, regulation, and enforcement to sustain the myths as against 
arguments otherwise. A company that comes to believe that its business model will accomplish 
wonders but is being held back by archaic regulatory norms has little difficulty in fostering an 
aggressive attitude toward opportunism. 
 96. See Thomas M. Jones et al., How Applying Instrumental Stakeholder Theory Can Provide 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 43 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 371, 371–73 (2018). 
2020] Primacy, Publicness, and “Privateness” 401 
because of intense competition or disruption of their markets. Here, the 
short game comes to be seen as the only game.97 Arguably, some firms 
(and industries) are so fast-paced that they take on permanent “last period” 
status in terms of the kinds of beliefs and behaviors that are validated and 
rewarded.98 Given that their integrity metric was drawn from the “best 
places to work” survey tool, perhaps GSZ’s authors are getting their results 
about the payoffs from integrity from the less visibly stressed sector of the 
economy.99 Or, perhaps a bit more disturbingly, reputations are sticky, so 
both the internal and external perceptions of the commitment to integrity 
can persist longer than is justifiable, creating a profitable opportunity in 
the relative near-term to cash in on the built-up reputational capital.100 
Enron, after all, was a best place to work—number 22 on Fortune’s 
ranking in the year 2000101—until it suddenly became bankrupt and 
deemed a criminal enterprise a year later. 
Whatever is going on in the first step in the GSZ analysis, their 
second inference—that increased shareholder presence or power leads to 
an erosion in integrity—makes sense under the adaptive culture 
hypothesis. It seems amply plausible that external shareholder pressure 
increases internal stress, which challenges the efficacy of the internal 
“grease” of shared beliefs. High information asymmetry coupled with 
potentially adverse consequences from bad news, or even not-so-bad 
news, that cannot be processed with precision (the tip of the iceberg 
problem to which GSZ alludes) incentivizes disclosure gamesmanship.102 
Here, we can again borrow from psychology. Well-known work by Lerner 
and Tetlock suggests that accountability can have beneficial effects ex ante 
in resolving agency cost problems. However, it backfires as applied ex 
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post, leading to defensiveness rather than integrity.103 Where that becomes 
the inclination, it would be difficult to maintain a healthy culture. Again, 
this is situational. Firms that are for the moment generating mainly good 
news can celebrate honestly. But when the internal news turns sour and 
potentially blameworthy, the temptation to turn to denial and 
defensiveness strengthens. The gamesmanship (or worse) is thereby 
legitimized. 
All this leads me to a brief observation about “short-termism” in the 
corporate governance debates.104 For reasons discussed earlier, I am 
reasonably well persuaded that integrity is undervalued in the capital 
markets. Not because integrity is unimportant, but because it is hard to 
commit to the credibly-given dynamics just described. Some firms 
overcome the challenge and gain stable and reliable reputations, but most 
do not. Credibility, then, is a key variable, which when doubted by the 
marketplace leads to managerial (and cultural) frustration and greater 
inwardness. One foreseeable managerial response is to take steps to 
manage impressions better—salient short-term actions that will have a 
payoff. Cost cutting is a possibility, which can produce the pressures and 
rationalizations that cause a drop in ethics and heightened compliance 
risks. That much I concede, is consistent with the empirical observations. 
Going public generates ethical stress. But it is mainly when managerial 
credibility is already in doubt that makes it unfair and misleading to 
attribute any cultural devolution to investor greed or amoral myopia, much 
less legal norms about serving shareholders. In the end, managers of such 
firms are as complicit as anyone for setting in motion the kind of internal 
culture where self-serving visions of success and survival come to 
dominate. If so, more managerialism would not be a good antidote. 
IV. CULTURE AND THE PRIMACY DEBATES 
The political push in favor of greater managerialism implies that 
diminishing the influence of investors would bring about a return to 
benevolence and a greater focus on the collective long term. Integrity and 
stewardship values can be restored to cultural prominence. The detritus of 
shareholder wealth obsession flows out of the system, replaced by cleaner 
water. So, the managerialists’ campaign slogan promises. But our survey 
of how cultures evolve gives reason for doubt. 
The managerialists may be right in their prediction, of course—there 
are foreseeable political and economic conditions where that could 
                                                     
 103. See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999) (discussing pressures to reveal or cover up). 
 104. More broadly with respect to arguments about whether short-termism is a problem in the 
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happen. But if my hypothesis is right that cultures emerge and change 
organically as survival mechanisms to adapt to perceived conditions,105 
this is hardly assured. Increasing stress is likely to be a constant in a global, 
technology-driven economy. 
Notwithstanding anecdotal evidence, like Enron’s positioning of a 
stock ticker display in its headquarters lobby,106 I am skeptical that 
corporate managers ever embraced a norm of shareholder primacy, so 
much as paying it lip service from within the familiar protections of the 
business judgment rule. My hypothesis is that corporate managers have a 
deep-seated suspicion of shareholders, considering them insufficiently 
knowledgeable about long-term firm value and/or biased by conflicts of 
interest. In other words, managers understand the power investors have, 
especially over market prices, but resent it as an unwarranted imposition. 
Shareholders are therefore perceived as out-groups, not in-groups. The 
just desserts from success are divided up among managers and 
stakeholders pursuant to a bias on the part of directors that sees the 
managers as main creators of the value107 and lesser stakeholders 
(including shareholders) as mere suppliers of resources who need to be 
paid. The stock and options in which managers are paid naturally make 
them want high stock prices—they are by no means indifferent to that 
which also produces shareholder wealth. But the myth and the resulting 
motivation ascribe something more sacred to marketplace success, even if 
objective outsiders might see in this something akin to what psychologists 
refer to the fundamental attribution bias (i.e., taking excess credit for 
success, while externalizing blame for failure).108 This frustration has led 
to the campaign we identified earlier, pushing back hard to recreate the 
world of managerial autonomy as against the supposed short-termism of 
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shareholder influence. But as we noted earlier and will soon come back to, 
there is another way of reading that story.109 
The historical image of twentieth century managerialism as a golden 
era wrecked by shareholder primacy may well be a self-serving myth. 
Brian Cheffins points out in recent work that there is evidence of little 
scandal and high willingness to contribute to labor peace and maintaining 
the social infrastructure,110 but he observes that this was a product of a 
unique time in American history, with a surplus of rents to collect and 
spend, not likely to be repeated going forward. I doubt that that time was 
ever as pro-social as portrayed,111 but agree with his assessment of its 
historical contingency to whatever degree it was accurate. Unless coupled 
with a step up in what government or the public insist on from large firms, 
the golden era image works mainly as a rallying cry for taking back control 
along with the rents. 
And the latter brings us back to publicness. The hoped-for 
consequence of the dismissal of shareholder primacy, to many, is to create 
a vacuum that would be filled with pro-social norms. With enough external 
pressure and the right political conditions, it could. But, I doubt that such 
pressure would be any more welcome inside the corporate culture than 
shareholder demands. At first glance, this should pose no comparable 
threat to internal culture. Disclosure and accountability are soft and benign 
sounding demands that would not be likely to generate much internal 
dissonance, especially when the cultural boundaries of the firm are 
relatively porous. There is ample evidence that successful engagement 
with stakeholders in response to the expectations of publicness pay off for 
perceptive firms.112 
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2020] Primacy, Publicness, and “Privateness” 405 
But at many firms, I suspect, the demands of publicness are also 
coded as threats, especially when the internal culture feels under attack 
from outside. The demands can seem harsh and unforgiving,113 and are 
thus interpreted as unfair and undeserved in order to maintain cognitive 
consistency and self-respect. So, they trigger denial and reactance. 
Honesty is a hard norm to maintain when outside groups demand 
transparency, accountability, and voice, and those inside (via self-
deception or not) come to believe that the truth will be distorted or 
misunderstood in applying those demands. In particular, elite managers 
and other incumbents will see publicness as a threat to the efficiency of 
the internal corporate culture as an extension of their attitudes, beliefs, and 
preferences. So, my hypothesis would be that many of the concerns about 
external demands undermining the coherence and efficiency of the internal 
culture are present with respect to publicness as well. 
Again, this depends on how forceful publicness is. I lean in favor of 
it as valuable to corporate law and governance but have to concede that 
there are open questions. A largely unexplored aspect of publicness has to 
do with the efficacy of the demands—Do they actually pay off in a 
meaningful way for stakeholders and society, if not in dividends or capital 
appreciation? Publicness is hard to measure empirically. Maybe measures 
of social responsibility and sustainability are workable proxies for 
publicness. However, the state of the art of assessing its embrace and 
sustainable commitment (and who it benefits) is still early-stage. For all 
the skirmishing in the aftermath of multiple scandals in the last two 
decades, transparency remains limited, accountability often fails 
dramatically, and outsider voices are amplified but still may not matter. 
We may have what Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have described as a 
world of corporate governance that uses symbolic public palliatives to 
normalize concentrated corporate control with weak effects in terms of 
outcomes.114 They can be more about identity politics than real stakeholder 
influence.115 If so, the internal corporate invective that the demands of 
publicness badly fail a cost–benefit test cannot be dismissed as mere 
defensiveness, even though I suspect it often is. Myths thrive by ingesting 
grains of truth. The pushback against publicness may overwhelm it so all 
that would fill the vacuum in the demise of shareholder empowerment is 
autonomy in the gathering and distribution of rents. 
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V. PRIVATENESS 
The cultural effects of external pressures from public shareholders 
and stakeholders can usefully be assessed by imagining conditions in firms 
where those pressures are weakest. Firms vary in their susceptibility to the 
amalgam of legal and extralegal pressures. SEC registrants get a big dose 
of it for that reason alone. However, a large, closely-held corporation is 
subject to regulatory demands (including the antifraud parts of the 
securities laws) and many of the legitimacy demands that come from 
consumers, politicians, the media, and other stakeholders. Size matters, 
but the heft of the company’s footprint on society does even more. It is all 
a matter of degree, a recursive loop of law and public salience. 
Almost by definition, then, there will also be certain corporations that 
face less pressure, inhabiting a dimly lit social and economic setting closer 
to “privateness” than publicness. Corporations gain a greater degree of 
privateness by avoiding public share ownership, though as just noted, 
autonomy may be limited by other factors: size, field-specific regulatory 
intensity, or visibility in public-facing product or labor markets. So, the 
natural question relating to culture is to ask what we might predict as we 
move toward greater privateness. Empirical work is less helpful here 
because private firms generate less data for the variables that might affect 
culture.116 
Consistent with the earlier conjectures about how publicness 
decreases internal culture coherence by challenging the beliefs and power 
negotiations (self-serving or otherwise) that grease the internal corporate 
machinery, a plausible assumption would be that privateness at the very 
least enables a stronger, more coherent internal culture. Private firms face 
far less pressure to speak publicly about sensitive matters, avoiding the tip 
of the iceberg problem that GSZ identify.117 Messages in a relatively 
closed system are less likely to become mixed or garbled and are more 
likely to stay on script. Governance need not be negotiated as much. 
This prediction, then, aligns with GSZ—on average, cultures in the 
private ownership space have more stability under stress, producing long-
term value when the underlying values are about integrity and care for 
stakeholders. But I suspect that there is considerable volatility and 
considerable risk associated with too much privateness. Private firms are 
                                                     
 116. Private companies are also very diverse and under-theorized, so that drawing from some 
overarching governance paradigm is foolish. See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. 
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 117. See Levy, supra note 79. See generally Nieuwenboer, supra note 79 (discussing conscious 
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also likely to be places where the prevailing power structure can perpetuate 
a culture that reflects the beliefs, egos, and desires of those in charge, 
which will not always be so benign or other-regarding. The Nut Island 
effect, mentioned earlier, shows what can happen when a subculture 
becomes obsessed with privilege and privacy.118 And successful startups 
surely have their own narratives about risk-taking (and rule-bending) that 
resist the discipline of internal controls and full disclosure.119 I would 
suggest something of a U-shaped curve, with cultures doing their best 
when checks and balances are working. 
These conjectures require rigorous testing, of course, which again is 
not particularly easy. Data is harder to come by for private firms, and when 
privacy and freedom are prized, those in power may not open up candidly 
to ethnographers or survey-takers. Anecdotally, the story told about 
private companies that have taken on an outsized (but not publicly visible) 
role in conservative politics is unsettling. An apparently large number of 
the leaders in the corporate liberty (anti-regulation) movement—for which 
the Koch brothers have become the most well-known—had run-ins with 
environmental, consumer protection, or securities regulators earlier in 
their firms’ histories.120 The anger turned into denial and rationalization. 
Cultural scripts that de-legitimatize regulators by stressing the 
oppositional ideology behind law making (e.g., EPA staff as radical 
environmentalists) or its mindlessness—lazy bureaucrats who have never 
had to sell a product or meet a payroll—substantially reduces the felt need 
to obey the law for reasons short of fear of sanctions.121 In turn, such a 
cultural trope enables more aggressive political spending to disable or 
impoverish the regulators even more. Here, in a reversal of the common 
assumption about how the general culture influences corporate culture, the 
rationalizations from inside the corporate world come to affect (or infect) 
the political and social culture. As our society becomes more and more 
polarized, with far too many people convinced that Washington is the 
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official year-round home of the devil and his helpers from the domain of 
publicness, I strongly suspect that there will be even more corporate 
cultures where the illegitimacy myth becomes infectious.122 
All this brings more resonance to the legal debate, for example, of 
whether to require public companies to disclose their political activities 
and spending practices.123 Proponents (like me) think that such disclosure 
would be valuable to shed sunlight on the possibility that senior managers 
use corporate funds to foster their personal political preferences, which 
they simply rationalize as corporate best interests; opponents push back 
with claims that market pressures and good governance practices suffice 
to assure that management keeps its eye on wealth maximization alone, 
and disclosure will compromise savvy political strategies. Surely there is 
a cultural angle to this that deserves to be explored as to both public and 
private firms. 
CONCLUSION 
We have now circled back to the governance wars introduced earlier 
in this Article. This has become bitterly contested territory to committed 
managerialists, and so it may have seemed shocking that in August 2019, 
the Business Roundtable—CEOs of the largest corporations in America—
publicly disavowed the shareholder primacy norm that it had endorsed 
since 1997 in favor of a commitment to all corporate stakeholders, a nod 
to publicness.124 
There was no reference to corporate cultures in this. The ease of the 
shift, however, bolsters one claim that I have been making throughout this 
Article: that management has never thoroughly embraced shareholder 
primacy as a value, instead resenting its demands. As to a commitment to 
publicness, the shift says nothing about actually being accountable, truly 
transparent, or giving stakeholders any real power, and so adheres to the 
long-standing managerialist goal of autonomy over all else. The business 
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leaders are simply making a strategic bet that the “shareholders above all” 
movement, for now at least, is becoming less politically appealing. 
So, I doubt that any battle lines are actually being redrawn, even 
though some fractures along the fronts have become visible. 
Managerialists have for some time been divided between hard-core 
libertarians and those seeking accommodation in search of social license. 
The former continue to seek a wider swath of autonomy and corporate 
privacy almost as a natural right. The First Amendment has emerged as a 
newly potent litigation tool, enabling this campaign in terms of brute 
political spending125 and perhaps—depending on how the law of corporate 
freedom of speech turns over the next few years—creating more space for 
a constitutional freedom not to speak so as to check the regulatory state’s 
love affair with disclosure requirements.126 
We should not even try to predict the outcome of any of these 
forthcoming battles, much less the so-called war. Both shareholder rights 
and stakeholder rights are loosely perceived as progressive causes, as we 
have seen, but many left-leaning participants have a strong aversion to the 
power and privilege associated with massive holdings of investor wealth, 
especially when directly at the production of even more shareholder 
wealth.127 The right has in the recent past been a reliable ally for 
managerial power, but as Steve Bainbridge writes, there is potential stress 
here as well if right-leaning economic populism redraws the terms of 
corporate social responsibility in its own nativist image.128 So, other 
influential actors in the business community seem anxious to make peace 
on both fronts, fearful of the angry direction in which public discourse is 
turning. 
For a few years now, evidence has mounted that the public 
corporation as we knew it for most of the twentieth century is in decline, 
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at least numerically if not in gross size.129 Many corporate governance and 
corporate law scholars have weighed in on whether, why, and if whatever 
is happening here is good or bad. A large part of the response is once again 
political, generating endless deregulatory initiatives in the name of global 
competitiveness, innovation, and job creation to bring the public company 
back to health. Facilitating a world of private capital that deserves less, if 
any, regulatory support and intervention beyond protecting property and 
contract rights is a move that thrills conservatives in business and politics, 
part of a many-faceted assault on the regulatory state and its enabler, 
publicness. 
The social science we have reviewed ostensibly bolsters the 
deregulators’ case by offering evidence that strong shareholder rights (or 
a strong norm of shareholder primacy) are a threat to good corporate 
culture. I get the point that all other things being equal, highly focused 
cultures are easier to maintain and generate more value in the absence of 
heavy shareholder and stock market pressures, for the reasons given 
above. But all other things are rarely equal, and cultures can devolve for 
many different reasons. Then, something or someone has to disrupt that 
cultural devolution, and shareholders may be best positioned to operate as 
a check on culture run amok. 
The supposed value of publicness, on the other hand, is not at all 
about efficiency or profitability. Indeed, this is where most sociologists 
and many progressive legal scholars seem to end up. Shareholder primacy 
undermines the public good and should be curbed, whereas greater 
transparency, accountability, and voice are good for us all. On the other 
hand, fervent managerialists want neither and thus are inclined to lump 
them together to challenge their legitimacy. That creates a political 
dilemma for progressives. Precisely because publicness is so inchoate, 
there is (currently) no powerful, organized force to lobby on its behalf. By 
and large, it has to rely on allies, the most effective of which come from 
the progressive side of the institutional investor community, or wait for 
scandals large enough to create a brief moment of political opportunity to 
seek something stronger. Conversely, the shareholder rights community 
needs political help, too, and sees the publicness values as a supportive 
ideology. Thus, publicness and the shareholder rights stay coupled to a 
greater extent than they need be conceptually. In turn, effective political 
attacks on one are felt by the other. If that continues, we will see what the 
consequences are. Publicness remains an important phenomenon 
descriptively, which is why it is so contested politically and why so much 
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effort goes into giving firms flexibility in financing, liquidity, and 
governance without triggering public status.130 Normatively, it is hard to 
measure its impact on corporate behavior. 
My aim here has not been to answer the normative questions of what 
good, if any, publicness does, or whether the turn to privateness is anything 
more than rent-seeking. I hope to have said something interesting about 
corporate culture: the many ways it is studied, the comparisons and 
contrasts in theories about what it is and how it works, and the ways it is 
influenced by and in turn influences more general social beliefs about 
economic power and privilege. Corporate publicness and privateness are 
competing to write the dominant narrative about the legitimate exercise of 
economic power in society, seeking all the legitimacy their champions can 
muster. Whatever direction all this battling takes, the importance of 
corporate culture should not be ignored. 
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